Azerbaijanis have also immigrated and resettled in large numbers in Central Iran, mainly Tehran,[41][b]Qom[41][43][44] and Karaj.[45][46] They have also emigrated and resettled in large numbers in Khorasan.[41] Immigrant Azerbaijani communities have been represented by people prominent not only among urban and industrial working classes but also in commercial, administrative, political, religious, and intellectual circles.[41]
Scholars put the population of Azerbaijanis in Iran between 12 and 23 million.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]Iranologist Victoria Arakelova believes that political doctrines following the dissolution of the Soviet Union caused the inflation of the Iranian Azerbaijani as almost half of the 60 million Iranian population, which later decreased to 20 million, lingering for a while. She puts the number at 6 to 6.5 million.[8]
The Iranian Azerbaijani culture was produced by centuries of a symbiosis and mixture between native and nomadic elements.[56] According to Richard Frye, Iranian Azerbaijanis largely descend from the pre-existing Iranian-speakers, who were Turkified after a massive migration of Oghuz Turks but still exist in smaller pockets,[57] while Olivier Roy writes that the Azerbaijani ethnogenesis involved the Turkification of the natives by Turkomans from Anatolia.[58] According to Russian scholar Rostislav Rybakov, Iranian Azerbaijan was almost fully Turkicized by 14th and 15th centuries, though the local population left its mark in the Azerbaijani culture and language and the ethnic border between the Turkish people and Azerbaijanis was established in the 16th century.[59] Scholars note cultural similarities between modern Persians and Azerbaijanis.[60]
Genetics
A comparative study (2013) on the complete mitochondrial DNA diversity in Iranians has indicated that Iranian Azerbaijanis are more related to the people of Georgia, than they are to other Iranians, as well as to Armenians. The same multidimensional scaling plot demonstrates the intermediate position of Caucasian Azerbaijanis between the Azeris/Georgians and Turks/Iranians groupings.[61] There is no significant difference between Iranian Azerbaijanis and other major ethnic groups of Iran.[62]
According to HLA testing, Azerbaijanis of Iran cluster together with the Turkmens of Gorgan and Kurds and constitute an intermediate position between Iranian populations and Western Siberians, specifically Chuvash, Mansi people, and Buryats (subgroups of Turkic peoples, Ugrians, and Mongols respectively).[63] Several genetic studies show that the Azerbaijanis' gene pool largely overlap with that of the native populations in support of language replacement, including elite dominance, scenarios,[64] while also demonstrating significant genetic influence from Siberia and Mongolia.[65]
History
Background: Dividing of the Azerbaijanis by the Russian Empire
Following the Russo-Persian Wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28, the Caucasian territories of Qajar Iran were ceded to the Russian Empire. The Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 finalized the borders between the Russian Empire and Qajar Iran.[66][67] The areas to the north of the river Aras, including the territory of the contemporary Republic of Azerbaijan, were Iranian territory until they were occupied by Russia over the course of the 19th century.[68] The Russo-Persian Wars of the 19th century settled the modern-day boundary of Iran, stripping it of all its Caucasian territories and incorporating them into the Russian Empire. The eventual formation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918 established the territory of modern Azerbaijan.
As a direct result of Qajar Iran's forced ceding to Russia, the Azerbaijanis are nowadays parted between two nations: Iran and Azerbaijan.[69] Despite living on two sides of an international border, the Azerbaijanis form a single ethnic group.[70]
Russo-Persian War (1826–28)
The burden of the Russo-Persian War (1826–28) was on the tribes of Qaradağ region, who being in front line, provided human resources and provision of the Iranian army. In the wake of the war, a significant fraction of the inhabitants of this area lived as nomadic tribes (ایلات). The major tribes included; Cilibyanlu 1,500 tents and houses, Karacurlu 2500, Haji Alilu 800, Begdillu 200, and various minor groups 500.[71] At the time Ahar, with 3,500 inhabitants, was the only city of Qaradağ.[72] The Haji-Alilu tribe played major rule in the later political developments.
Persian Constitutional Revolution of early twentieth century
During the Persian Constitutional Revolution, Tabriz was at the center of battles which followed the ascent to the throne of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar on 8 January 1907. The revolutionary forces were headed by Sattar Khan who was originally from Arasbaran.[73][74][75]Haydar Khan Amo-oghli had significant contribution in the inception and progression of the revolution, and introducing leftist ideas into Iranian mainstream politics.[76] During the following tumultuous years, Amir Arshad, the headman of Haji-Alilu tribe, had a major impact on the subsequent political developments in Iran in relation to the status of Iranian Kurds. He is credited with fending off communism from Iran.[77][78]
Role of Iranian Azerbaijani intellectuals in modern Iranian ultra-nationalism
The ill-fated Constitutional Revolution did not bring democracy to Iran. Instead, Rezā Shāh, then Brigadier-General of the Persian Cossack Brigade, deposed Ahmad Shah Qajar, the last Shah of the Qajar dynasty, and founded the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 and established a despotic monarchy.[80][81] His insistence on ethnicnationalism and cultural unitarism along with forced detribalization and sedentarization resulted in suppression of several ethnic and social groups, including Azerbaijanis.[82] Ironically, the main architect of this totalitarian policy, which was justified by reference to racial ultra-nationalism, was Mirza Fatali Akhundov, an intellectual from Azerbaijan.[83][84] In accordance with the Orientalist views of the supremacy of the Aryan peoples, he idealized pre-Islamic Achaemenid and Sassanid empires, whilst negating the 'Islamization' of Persia by Muslim forces."[85] This idealization of a distant past was put into practice by both the Pahlavi kings, particularly Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who honored himself with the title Āryāmehr, Light of the Aryans.[86]Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in an interview concisely expressed his views by declaring, "we Iranians are Aryans, and the fact that we are not adjacent to other Aryan nations in Europe is just a geographical anomaly.".[87]
Mirza Fatali Akhundov is not the only Azerbaijani intellectual in framing Iranian ultra-nationalism. Hassan Taqizadeh, the organizer of "Iran Society" in Berlin, has contributed to the development of Iranian nationalism. Since 1916 he published "Kaveh" periodical in Farsi language, which included articles emphasizing the racial unity of Germans and Iranians.[88][89]Ahmad Kasravi, Taqi Arani, Hossein Kazemzadeh (Iranshahr) and Mahmoud Afshar advocated the suppression of the Azerbaijani language as they supposed that the multilingualism contradicted the racial purity of Iranians.[90][91] Therefore, It is noteworthy that, contrary to what one might expect, many of the leading agents of the construction of an Iranian bounded territorial entity came from non-Persian-speaking ethnic minorities, and the foremost were the Azerbaijanis, rather than the nation's titular ethnic group, the Persians.
The most important political development affecting the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century was the collapse of the Ottoman and the Russian empires. The idea of a greater homeland for all Turks was propagated by pan-Turkism, which was adopted almost at once as a main ideological pillar by the Committee of Union and Progress and somewhat later by other political caucuses in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of World War I, pan-Turkist propaganda focused chiefly on the Turkic-speaking peoples of the southern Caucasus, in Iranian Azerbaijan and Turkistan in Central Asia, with the ultimate purpose of persuading them all to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and to join the new pan-Turkic homeland.
It was this latter appeal to Iranian Azerbaijanis which, contrary to pan-Turkist intentions, caused a small group of Azerbaijani intellectuals to become the most vociferous advocates of Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty. If in Europe "romantic nationalism responded to the damage likely to be caused by modernism by providing a new and larger sense of belonging, an all-encompassing totality, which brought about new social ties, identity and meaning, and a new sense of history from one's origin on to an illustrious future,"(42) in Iran after the Constitutional movement romantic nationalism was adopted by the Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the irredentist policies threatening the country's territorial integrity. In their view, assuring territorial integrity was a necessary first step on the road to establishing the rule of law in society and a competent modern state which would safeguard collective as well as individual rights. It was within this context that their political loyalty outweighed their other ethnic or regional affinities.
The failure of the Democrats in the arena of Iranian politics after the Constitutional movement and the start of modern state-building paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group's cultural nationalism. Whereas the adoption of integrationist policies preserved Iran's geographic integrity and provided the majority of Iranians with a secure and firm national identity, the blatant ignoring of other demands of the Constitutional movement, such as the call for the formation of a society based on law and order, left the country still searching for a political identity. The ultimate purpose was to persuade these populations to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and join the new pan-Turkic homeland.[92] It was the latter appeal to Iranian Azerbaijanis, which, contrary to Pan-Turkist intentions, caused a small group of Azerbaijani intellectuals to become the strongest advocates of the territorial integrity of Iran.[92]
After the constitutional revolution in Iran, a romantic nationalism was adopted by Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the pan-Turkist irredentist policies threatening Iran's territorial integrity.[92] It was during this period that Iranism and linguistic homogenization policies were proposed as a defensive nature against all others.[92] Contrary to what one might expect, foremost among innovating this defensive nationalism were Iranian Azerbaijanis.[92] They viewed that assuring the territorial integrity of the country was the first step in building a society based on law and a modern state.[92] Through this framework, their political loyalty outweighed their ethnic and regional affiliations.[92] The adoption of these integrationist policies paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group's cultural nationalism.[92]
World War II and Soviet intervention
In late 1941 Soviet forces invaded Iran in coordination with British Army under an operation known as Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. Their forces broke through the border and moved from the Azerbaijan SSR into Iranian Azerbaijan. Reza Shah was forced by the invading British to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who replaced his father as Shah on the throne on 16 September 1941. At the aftermath of a four-year-long tumultuous period the Azerbaijan People's Government, a Soviet puppet state, was established in Tabriz, perhaps through direct involvement of the Soviet leadership.[93][citation needed] This government autonomously ruled the province from November 1945 to November 1946.[94] However, the Soviet soon realized their idea was premature, the mass of the population did not support separatism;[95] under largely Western pressure, the Soviet troops withdrew in 1946, which resulted in the quick collapse of the Azerbaijan People's Government.[94]
Iranian Azerbaijani migration to Azerbaijan
Beginning in the 1850s, many Iranian Azerbaijanis opted to become work migrants and seek job opportunities in the Russian Empire, primarily in the economically booming Azerbaijani-populated part of the Caucasus. Due to them being Persian subjects, Russian offices often recorded them as "Persians". The migrants referred to one another as hamshahri ("compatriot") as an in-group identity. The word was adopted by the Azerbaijani-speaking locals as həmşəri and has since been applied by them to Iranian Azerbaijani migrants in general. Already in the nineteenth century, the word also spread to urban varieties of Russian of Baku and Tiflis in the form of gamshara (гамшара) or amshara (амшара), where it was, however, used with a negative connotation to mean "a raggamuffin".[96][97] In the Soviet times, the word was borrowed into the Russian slang of Ashkhabad and was used to refer to forestallers.[98]
Iranian Azerbaijanis often worked menial jobs, including on dyer's madder plantations in Guba where 9,000 out of 14,000 Iranian Azerbaijani contract workers were employed as of 1867.[99] In the 1886 economic report on the life of the peasantry of the Guba district, Yagodynsky reported frequent cases of intermarriage between the Iranian work migrants and local women which prompted the former to settle in villages near Guba and quickly assimilate. Children from such families would be completely integrated in the community and not be regarded as foreigners or outsiders by its residents.[100]
Starting from the late nineteenth century, Baku was another popular destination for Iranian Azerbaijanis, thanks to its highly developing oil industry. By the beginning of the twentieth century, they already constituted 50% of all the oil workers of Baku,[101] and numbered 9,426 people in 1897, 11,132 people in 1903 and 25,096 people in 1913.[102]Amo-oghli and Sattar Khan notably worked in the Baku oil fields before returning to Iran and engaging in politics.
In 1925, there were 45,028 Iranian-born Azerbaijanis in the Azerbaijan SSR.[103] Of those, 15,000 (mostly oil workers, port and navy workers and railway workers) had retained Iranian citizenship by 1938 and were concentrated in Baku and Ganja. In accordance with the 1938 decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, residents of Azerbaijan with Iranian citizenship were given 10 days to apply for Soviet citizenship and were then relocated to Kazakhstan. Those who refused (numbering 2,878 people) became subject to deportation back to Iran immediately.[104] Some naturalized Iranian Azerbaijanis were later accused of various anti-Soviet activities and arrested or even executed in the so-called "Iranian operation" of 1938.[105]
However, with the advent of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the emphasis shifted away from nationalism as the new government highlighted religion as the main unifying factor. Within the Islamic Revolutionary government there emerged an Azerbaijani nationalist faction led by Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, who advocated greater regional autonomy and wanted the constitution to be revised to include secularists and opposition parties; this was denied.[107] Other Azerbaijanis played an important rule in the revolution including Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Bazargan, Sadeq Khalkhali, and Ali Khamenei.
In October 2020, several protests erupted in Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Tabriz, in support of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[112][113] Iranian Azerbaijani demonstrators chanted pro-Azerbaijan slogans and clashed with Iran's security forces.[114]
Generally, Iranian Azerbaijanis were regarded as "a well integrated linguistic minority" by academics prior to Iran's Islamic Revolution.[115][116] Despite friction, they came to be well represented at all levels of, "political, military, and intellectual hierarchies, as well as the religious hierarchy.".[117]: 188 In addition, the current Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, is half Azerbaijani.[118] In contrast to the claims of de facto discrimination of some Iranian Azerbaijanis, the government claims that its policy in the past 30 years has been one of pan-Islamism, which is based on a common Islamic religion of which diverse ethnic groups may be part, and which does not favor or repress any particular ethnicity, including the Persian majority.[119] Persian language is thus merely used as the lingua franca of the country, which helps maintain Iran's traditional centralized model of government. More recently, the Azerbaijani language and culture is being taught and studied at the university level in Iran, and there appears to exist publications of books, newspapers and apparently, regional radio broadcasts too in the language.[120]
Furthermore, Article 15 of Iran's constitution reads:
The use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.[121]
According to Professor. Nikki R. Keddie of UCLA: "One can purchase newspapers, books, music tapes, and videos in Azerbaijani and Kurdish, and there are radio and television stations in ethnic areas that broadcast news and entertainment programs in even more languages".[122]
Azerbaijani nationalism has oscillated since the Islamic revolution and recently escalated into riots over the publication in May 2006 of a cartoon that many Azerbaijanis found offensive.[123][124] The cartoon was drawn by Mana Neyestani, an ethnic Azerbaijani, who was fired along with his editor as a result of the controversy.[125][126]
Another series of protests took place in November 2015, in the cities of Iranian Azerbaijan including Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil and Zanjan, in response to an episode of a popular children's program called Fitileh which had depicted what was seen as a racist image of Azerbaijanis. Mohammad Sarafraz director-general of the IRIB[127] and Davud Nemati-Anarki, the head of the public relations department, officially apologised for the "unintentional offense" caused by the program.[128] Protests were also held in July 2016 in Tehran, Tabriz, Urmia, Maragheh, Zanjan, Ahar, Khoy, and Ardabil in response to "denigration of Azerbaijanis by the state media". Plastic bullets were shot at protesters and several people were arrested.[129][130]
Despite sporadic problems, Azerbaijanis are an intrinsic community within Iran.[131] Currently, the living conditions of Iranian Azerbaijanis closely resemble that of Persians:
The life styles of urban Azeri do not differ from those of Persians, and there is considerable intermarriage among the upper classes in cities of mixed populations. Similarly, customs among Azeri villagers do not appear to differ markedly from those of Persian villagers.[25]
Iranian Azerbaijanis are in high positions of authority with the Azerbaijanis Ayatollah Ali Khamenei currently sitting as the Supreme Leader. Azerbaijanis in Iran remain quite conservative in comparison to most Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, since the Republic of Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, there has been renewed interest and contact between Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border.
Andrew Burke writes:
Azeri are famously active in commerce and in bazaars all over Iran their voluble voices can be heard. Older Azeri men wear the traditional wool hat and their music and dances have become part of the mainstream culture. Azeris are well integrated and many Azeri Iranians are prominent in Persian literature, politics and clerical world.[132]
According to Bulent Gokay:
The Northern part of Iran, that used to be called Azerbaijan, is inhabited by 17 million Azeris. This population has been traditionally well integrated with the multi-ethnic Iranian state.[133]
Richard Thomas, Roger East, and Alan John Day state:
The 15–20 million Azeri Turks living in northern Iran, ethnically identical to Azeris, have embraced Shia Islam and are well integrated into Iranian society[134]
According to Michael P. Croissant:
Although Iran's fifteen-million Azeri population is well integrated into Iranian society and has shown little desire to secede, Tehran has nonetheless shown extreme concern with prospects of the rise of sentiments calling for union between the two Azerbaijans.[135]
While Iranian Azerbaijanis may seek greater linguistic rights, few of them display separatist tendencies. Extensive reporting by Afshin Molavi, an Iranian Azerbaijani scholar, in the three major Azerbaijani provinces of Iran, as well as among Iranian Azerbaijanis in Tehran, found that separatist sentiment was not widely held among Iranian Azerbaijanis. Few people framed their genuine political, social and economic frustration – feelings that are shared by the majority of Iranians – within an ethnic context.[131]
According to another Iranian Azerbaijani scholar, Dr. Hassan Javadi – a Tabriz-born, Cambridge-educated scholar of Azerbaijani literature and professor of Persian, Azerbaijani and English literature at George Washington University – Iranian Azerbaijanis have more important matters on their mind than cultural rights. "Iran's Azerbaijani community, like the rest of the country, is engaged in the movement for reform and democracy," Javadi told the Central Asia Caucasus Institute crowd, adding that separatist groups represent "fringe thinking." He also told EurasiaNet: "I get no sense that these cultural issues outweigh national ones, nor do I have any sense that there is widespread talk of secession."[131]
Culture
Iranian Azerbaijanis were influenced by the Iranian culture.[60] At the same time, they have influenced and been influenced by their non-Iranian neighbors, especially Caucasians and Russians. Azerbaijani music is distinct music that is tightly connected to the music of other Iranian peoples such as Persian music and Kurdish music, and also the music of the Caucasian peoples. Although the Azerbaijani language is not an official language of Iran it is widely used, mostly orally, among the Iranian Azerbaijanis. Most Iranian Azerbaijanis are bilingual in Azerbaijani and Persian, and exogamy and intermarriage with other populations, particularly Persian speakers, are common among Iranian Azeri families that originated in the historic Azerbaijan region.[136][137] Azerbaijani-specific cultural aspects have somewhat diminished in prominence among the many Azeri families that have moved to large cities like Tehran during the past century.[136] Iranian Azerbaijanis are traditionally sensitive to their ethnic identity, but are supportive of bilingualism in Azerbaijani and Persian as well.[137]
Literature
Jahan Shah (r. 1438–67), the Qara Qoyunlu ("black sheep") ruler of Iran was a master poet. He compiled a diwan under the pen-name Haqiqi. Shah Ismail (1487–1524), who used the pen-name Khata'i, was a prominent ruler-poet and has, apart from his diwan compiled a mathnawi called Deh-name, consisting of some eulogies of Ali, the fourth Caliph of early Islam.[138] After the Safavid era, Azerbaijani could not sustain its early development. The main theme of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the development of verse-folk stories, mainly intended for performance by Ashughs in weddings. The most famous among these literary works are Koroghlu,[139] Ashiq Qərib, and Kərəm ilə Əsli.
Following the establishing of Qajar dynasty in Iran Azerbaijani literature flourished and reached its peak by the end of the nineteenth century. By then, journalism had been launched in Azerbaijani language and social activism had become the main theme of literary works. The most influential writers of this era are Fathali Akhondzadeh[140] and Mojez Shabestari.
Pahlavi era was the darkest[citation needed] period for Azerbaijani literature. The Azerbaijani language was banned in official spheres with the advent of Reza Shah's reign,[141] including at schools.[142][143] This prohibition was formally abolished after the Islamic revolution, though the Azerbaijanis haven't enjoyed much cultural freedom since then.[144] Writers of Azerbaijan, such as Gholam-Hossein Saedi, Samad Behrangi and Reza Barahani, published their works in Persian. The only exception was Mohammad-Hossein Shahriar, who is famous for his verse book, Heydar Babaya Salam;[145] simply he was too mighty to be censored. Shahriar's work was an innovative way of summarizing the Cultural identity in concise poetic form and was adapted by a generation of lesser-known poets, particularly from Qareh Dagh region, to record their oral traditions. One remarkable example is Abbas Eslami, known with his pen-name Barez, (1932–2011)[146] who described the melancholic demise of his homeland in a book titled mourning Sabalan.[147] Another example is Mohamad Golmohamadi's long poem, titled I am madly in love with Qareh Dagh (قاراداغ اؤلکهسینین گؤر نئجه دیوانهسی ام), is a concise description of the region's cultural landscape.[148]
The long-lasting suppression finally led to a generation of revolutionary poets, composing verses by allegoric allusion to the imposing landscape of Azerbaijan:
Sahand, o mountain of pure snow,
Descended from Heaven with Zoroaster
Fire in your heart, snow on your shoulders,
with storm of centuries,
And white hair of history on your chest ...
After the Islamic revolution of 1979, however, great literary works have not yet appeared and glory days of fifteenth century ruler-poets is not on the horizon. The contemporary literature is restricted to oral traditions, such as bayaties.[150][151]
Music
Traditional Azerbaijani music can be classified into two categories: the music of "ashugh" and the "mugham". Mugham, despite its similarity to Persian classic music and utmost importance in Azerbaijan, has not been popular among Iranian Azerbaijanis. The ashugh music had survived in the mountainous region of Qaradağ and presently is identified as the representative of the cultural identity of Azerbaijanis. Recent innovative developments, aiming to enhance the urban-appealing aspects of this ashugh performances, has drastically enhanced the status of ashugh music. The opening of academic-style music classes in Tabriz by master ashughs, such as Ashig Imran Heidari and Ashig Changiz Mehdipour, has greatly contributed to the ongoing image building.[citation needed]
Art
Living in the crossroads of many civilizations, Azerbaijani artisans have developed a rich tradition of decorative arts including rugs, lace, printed textiles, jewelry, vessels made of copper, engraved metals, wooden articles, and ceramics. Among these, carpet weaving stands out as the acme of Azerbaijani art.
Carpet weaving
Tabriz is one of the main centers of carpet weaving in Iran. At present 40% of Iranian carpet exports are originated from Tabriz.[152] These carpets are generally known as Tabriz rugs. Another carpet weaving center is Ardebil, which, despite being overshadowed by Tabriz in recent years, has produced the finest carpets in past. The two most famous Iranian rugs in the world had been woven in Ardebil in 1540. One is hung in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, and the other is in the Los Angeles County Museum of Arts. These carpets have silk warps and contain over thirty million knots.[153]
The acme of carpet weaving art is manifested in Verni,[154][155] which was originated in Nagorno-Karabakh. Verni is a carpet-like kilim with a delicate and fine warp and woof, which is woven without a previous sketch, thanks to the creative talents of nomadic women and girls. Verni weavers employ the image of birds and animals (deer, rooster, cat, snake, birds, gazelle, sheep, camel, wolf and eagle) in simple geometrical shapes, imitating the earthenware patterns that were popular in prehistoric times.[156] A key décor feature, which is intrinsic to many Vernis, is the S-element. Its shape varies, it may resemble both figure 5 and letter S. This element means "dragon" among the nomads. At present, Verni is woven by the girls of Arasbaran Tribes, often in the same room where the nomadic tribes reside,[157] and is a significant income source for about 20,000 families in Qaradagh region.[158][159] Verni weavers employ the image of birds and animals in simple geometrical shapes, imitating the earthenware patterns that were popular in prehistoric times.
The majority of Azerbaijanis are followers of Shia Islam. Azerbaijanis commemorate Shia holy days (ten first days of the holy month of Muharram) at least with the same intensity as other Iranians. In metropolitan cities with mixed ethnic composition, such as Tehran, Azerbaijanis are thought to be more intense in their expression of religious ritual than their Persian counterparts.[160] There is also a small minority of Azerbaijanis who practice the Baháʼí Faith.[161] Also in recent years, some Azerbaijanis in Iran have begun converting to Christianity,[162] which is strictly prohibited and can result in imprisonment.[163]
^also known as Iranian Azeris, Iranian Turks (Azerbaijani: ایران تورکلری), Persian Turks,[15][16][17] or Persian Azerbaijanis[18][19]
^Some estimates have suggested that one-third of the population of Tehran is Azeri,[30][42][verification needed] the Iranologist Victoria Arakelova however notes in peer-reviewed journal Iran and the Caucasus that the wide-spread "cliché" among residents of Tehran on the number of Azerbaijanis in the city ("half of Tehran consists of Azerbaijanis"), cannot be taken "seriously into consideration".[8] Arakelova adds that the number of Tehran's inhabitants who have migrated from northwestern areas of Iran, who are currently Persian-speakers "for the most part", is not more than "several hundred thousands", with the maximum being one million.[8]
References
^ abSwietochowski, Tadeusz; Collins, Brian C. (1999). Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. Scarecrow Press. p. 165. ISBN978-0-8108-3550-4.: Today, Iranian Azerbaijan has a solid majority of Azeris with an estimated population of at least 15 million (over twice the population of the Azerbaijani Republic). (1999)
^ ab"Iran". Ethnologue. Archived from the original on 4 September 2019. Retrieved 26 October 2018. Ethnic population: 15,900,000
^ abElling, Rasmus Christian. Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Excerpt: "The number of Azeris in Iran is heavily disputed. In 2005, Amanolahi estimated all Turkic-speaking communities in Iran to number no more than 9 million. CIA and Library of congress estimates range from 16 to 24 percent—that is, 12–18 million people if we employ the latest total figure for Iran's population (77.8 million). Azeri ethnicsts, on the other hand, argue that overall number is much higher, even as much as 50 percent or more of the total population. Such inflated estimates may have influenced some Western scholars who suggest that up to 30 percent (that is, some 23 million today) Iranians are Azeris." [1]Archived 5 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine
^ abBani-Shoraka, Helena (1 July 2009). "Cross-generational bilingual strategies among Azerbaijanis in Tehran". International Journal of the Sociology of Language (198): 106. doi:10.1515/IJSL.2009.029. ISSN1613-3668. S2CID144993160. The latest figures estimate the Azerbaijani population at 24% of Iran's 70 million inhabitants (NVI 2003/2004: 301). This means that there are between 15 and 20 million Azerbaijanis in Iran.
^ abMoaddel, Mansoor; Karabenick, Stuart A. (4 June 2013). Religious Fundamentalism in the Middle East: A Cross-National, Inter-Faith, and Inter-Ethnic Analysis. Brill. p. 101. The Azeris have a mixed heritage of Iranic, Caucasian, and Turkic elements(...) Between 16 to 23 million Azeris live in Iran.
^ abEschment, Beate; von Löwis, Sabine, eds. (18 August 2022). Post-Soviet Borders: A Kaleidoscope of Shifting Lives and Lands. Taylor & Francis. p. 31. Irrespective of the large Azerbaijani population in Iran (about 20 million, compared to 7 million in Azerbaijan)(...)
^Gheissari, Ali (2 April 2009). Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics. Oxford University Press. p. 300. ISBN978-0-19-988860-3. As of 2003, the ethnic classifications are estimated as: [...] Azeri (24 percent)
^"Richard Nelson Frye, "Persia", Allen & Unwin, 1968. pp 17:
"in World War II, contact with brethren in Soviet Azerbaijan likewise were not overly cordial since the Persian Azeris are committed to Iranian culture and consider their destiny to be with the Persians rather than with other Turks"
^Tadeusz Swietochowski, "Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community", Cambridge University Press, 2004. pg 192: [2]Archived 2016-04-01 at the Wayback Machine Excerpt "...identity with the Persian Azerbaijanis"
^Frye, R. N. "IRAN v. PEOPLES OF IRAN (1) A General Survey". Encyclopædia Iranica. XIII. pp. 321–326.
^ abLibrary of Congress, "Country Studies"- Iran: Azarbaijanis "Iran – Azarbaijanis". Archived from the original on 2011-07-04. Retrieved 2011-03-30. accessed March 2011.
^ ab"Chapter 2 – The Society and Its Environment: People and Languages: Turkic-speaking Groups: Azarbaijanis" in A Country Study: Iran Library of Congress Country Studies, Table of ContentsArchived 2007-03-13 at the Wayback Machine, last accessed 19 November 2008
^Plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Qazvin Province / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-53-3 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 268 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^National Bibliography Number: 2887000/plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Markazi Province / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-63-2 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 276 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^National Bibliography Number: 2887741 / plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Tehran Province / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-42-7 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 296 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^National Bibliography Number: 2890690 / plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Tehran 199066, Mashhad 292341, Isfahan 170017, Tabriz 18481, Karaj 278252, Shiraz 251703, Ahwaz 176403, Qom 207877 / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-68-7 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 296 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^National Bibliography Number: 2878470 / plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Qom Province / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-54-0 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 270 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^National Bibliography Number: 2890577 / plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Alborz Province / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-39-7 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 291 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^Савина В. И. (1980). "Этнонимы и топонимии Ирана". Ономастика Востока. М.: Наука. p. 151.
^Волкова Н. Г. (1996). "Этнонимия в трудах экономического обследования Кавказа 1880-х годов". Имя и этнос: общие вопросы ономастики, этнонимия, антропонимия, теонимия, топонимия: сборник. М.: Ин-т этнологии и антропологии. pp. 24–30. ISBN978-5-201-00825-3.
^"Азербайджанцы, армяне, айсоры". Народы Передней Азии. М.: Изд-во Академии наук СССР. 1957. p. 286.
KAJAR. The Kajars are considered a subgroup of the Azerbaijanis*. Historically, they have been a Turkic* Tribe who lived in Armenia. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Safavids tried to conquer the region, the Kajars settled in the Karabakh Khanate of western Azerbaijan. Agha Mohammed, a Kajar leader, overturned the Zend dynasty in Iran and established Kajar control in the area. This arrangement lasted u^il Reza Shah came to power in Iran in 1925. The Kajar population today exceeds 35,000 people, the vast majority of whom live in Iran.
^"Азербайджанцы, армяне, айсоры". Народы Передней Азии. М.: Изд-во Академии наук СССР. 1957. p. 284.
^Roy, Olivier (2000). The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. NYU Press. p. 6. ISBN9780814776094. Retrieved 1 April 2023. The mass of the Oghuz who crossed the Amu Darya towards the west left the Iranian plateaux, which remained Persian, and established themselves more to the west, in Anatolia. Here they divided into Ottomans, who were Sunni and settled, and Turkmens, who were nomads and in part Shiite (or, rather, Alevi). The latter were to keep the name 'Turkmen' for a long time: from the 13th century onwards they 'Turkised' the Iranian populations of Azerbaijan (who spoke west Iranian languages such as Tat, which is still found in residual forms), thus creating a new identity based on Shiism and the use of Turkish. These are the people today known as Azeris.
^""History of the East" ("Transcaucasia in 11th–15th centuries" in Rostislav Borisovich Rybakov (editor), History of the East. 6 volumes. v. 2. "East during the Middle Ages: Chapter V., 2002. – ISBN5-02-017711-3. "Восток в средние века. V. Закавказье в XI-XV вв". Archived from the original on 2011-07-13. Retrieved 2011-03-30. )".
^Farjadian, S.; Ghaderi, A. (December 2007). "HLA class II similarities in Iranian Kurds and Azeris". International Journal of Immunogenetics. 34 (6): 457–463. doi:10.1111/j.1744-313x.2007.00723.x. ISSN1744-3121. PMID18001303. S2CID22709345. Neighbor‐joining tree based on Nei's genetic distances and correspondence analysis according to DRB1, DQA1 and DQB1 allele frequencies showed a strong genetic tie between Kurds and Azeris of Iran. The results of AMOVA revealed no significant difference between these populations and other major ethnic groups of Iran
^Arnaiz-Villena, Antonio; Palacio-Gruber, Jose; Muñiz, Ester; Rey, Diego; Nikbin, Behrouz; Nickman, Hosein; Campos, Cristina; Martín-Villa, José Manuel; Amirzargar, Ali (2017). "Origin of Azeris (Iran) according to HLA genes". International Journal of Modern Anthropology. 1 (10): 115–138. doi:10.4314/ijma.v1i10.5. Azeris are integrated in the first cluster, together with Gorgan (Iranian Turkmen population (Rey et al. 2014)) and Kurds (Armirzargar et al. 2015), and in intermediate position between Iranian populations (Gonzalez-Galarza et al. 2011), and western Siberians: Russian Chuvash (who live near lower Volga River, 126 North Caspian Sea (Arnaiz-Villena et al. 2003)), Russian Siberian Mansi (from western Siberia (Uinuk-Ool et al. 2002)), Russian-Mongols Buryat (from Baikal Lake region (Uinuk-Ool et al. 2002)) and Russian Siberian Todja (from western Siberia, inhabiting in the northeastern part of Tuva Republic (Uinuk-Ool et al. 2002)).
^Yepiskoposian, L.; et al. (2011). "The Location of Azaris on the Patrilineal Genetic Landscape of the Middle East (A Preliminary Report)". Iran and the Caucasus. 15 (1): 73–78. doi:10.1163/157338411X12870596615395.
^Yunusbayev, Bayazit; Metspalu, Mait; Metspalu, Ene; Valeev, Albert; Litvinov, Sergei; Valiev, Ruslan; Akhmetova, Vita; Balanovska, Elena; Balanovsky, Oleg; Turdikulova, Shahlo; Dalimova, Dilbar (2015-04-21). "The Genetic Legacy of the Expansion of Turkic-Speaking Nomads across Eurasia". PLOS Genetics. 11 (4): e1005068. doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1005068. ISSN1553-7404. PMC4405460. PMID25898006. Our ADMIXTURE analysis (Fig 2) revealed that Turkic-speaking populations scattered across Eurasia tend to share most of their genetic ancestry with their current geographic non-Turkic neighbors. This is particularly obvious for Turkic peoples in Anatolia, Iran, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, but more difficult to determine for northeastern Siberian Turkic speakers, Yakuts and Dolgans, for which non-Turkic reference populations are absent. We also found that a higher proportion of Asian genetic components distinguishes the Turkic speakers all over West Eurasia from their immediate non-Turkic neighbors. These results support the model that expansion of the Turkic language family outside its presumed East Eurasian core area occurred primarily through language replacement, perhaps by the elite dominance scenario, that is, intrusive Turkic nomads imposed their language on indigenous peoples due to advantages in military and/or social organization(...) Thus, it is likely that migrants of SSM origin interacted with many of the ancestors of contemporary West Eurasian populations, but it was the stronger interaction (reflected in higher IBD sharing) with migrant SSM ancestors that drove Turkicization. We performed a permutation test for each western Turkic population and the observed excess of IBD sharing (compared to non-Turkic neighbors) with the SSM area populations was statistically significant (Fig 4 and S4 Fig).
^Harcave, Sidney (1968). Russia: A History: Sixth Edition. Lippincott. p. 267.
^Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz (2007). Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran: A Study of the Origin, Evolution, and Implications of the Boundaries of Modern Iran with Its 15 Neighbors in the Middle East by a Number of Renowned Experts in the Field. Universal. p. 372. ISBN978-1-58112-933-5.
^Cottam, Richard W. (1979). Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. p 18.
^Bayat, Mangol (1991). Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. p 145.
^ abcdefghTouraj Atabaki, "Recasting Oneself, Rejecting the Other: Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism" in Van Schendel, Willem(Editor). Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century. London, GBR: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2001. Actual Quote:
As far as Iran is concerned, it is widely argued that Iranian nationalism was born as a state ideology in the Reza Shah era, based on philological nationalism and as a result of his innovative success in creating a modern nation-state in Iran. However, what is often neglected is that Iranian nationalism has its roots in the political upheavals of the 19th century and the disintegration immediately following the Constitutional revolution of 1905– 9. It was during this period that Iranism gradually took shape as a defensive discourse for constructing a bounded territorial entity – the "pure Iran" standing against all others. Consequently, over time there emerged among the country's intelligentsia a political xenophobia which contributed to the formation of Iranian defensive nationalism. It is noteworthy that, contrary to what one might expect, many of the leading agents of the construction of an Iranian bounded territorial entity came from non-Persian-speaking ethnic minorities, and the foremost were the Azeris, rather than the nation's titular ethnic group, the Persians.
....
In the middle of April 1918, the Ottoman army invaded Azerbaijan for the second time.
...
Contrary to their expectations, however, the Ottomans did not achieve impressive success in Azerbaijan. Although the province remained under quasi-occupation by Ottoman troops for months, attempting to win endorsement for pan-Turkism ended in failure.
...
The most important political development affecting the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century was the collapse of the Ottoman and the Russian empires. The idea of a greater homeland for all Turks was propagated by pan-Turkism, which was adopted almost at once as a main ideological pillar by the Committee of Union and Progress and somewhat later by other political caucuses in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of World War I, pan-Turkist propaganda focused chiefly on the Turkic-speaking peoples of the southern Caucasus, in Iranian Azerbaijan and Turkistan in Central Asia, with the ultimate purpose of persuading them all to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and to join the new pan-Turkic homeland. It was this latter appeal to Iranian Azeris which, contrary to pan-Turkist intentions, caused a small group of Azeri intellectuals to become the most vociferous advocates of Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty. If in Europe ‘romantic nationalism responded to the damage likely to be caused by modernism by providing a new and larger sense of belonging, an all-encompassing totality, which brought about new social ties, identity and meaning, and a new sense of history from one's origin on to an illustrious future’,(42) in Iran after the Constitutional movement romantic nationalism was adopted by the Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the irredentist policies threatening the country's territorial integrity. In their view, assuring territorial integrity was a necessary first step on the road to establishing the rule of law in society and a competent modern state which would safeguard collective as well as individual rights. It was within this context that their political loyalty outweighed their other ethnic or regional affinities. The failure of the Democrats in the arena of Iranian politics after the Constitutional movement and the start of modern state-building paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group's cultural nationalism. Whereas the adoption of integrationist policies preserved Iran's geographic integrity and provided the majority of Iranians with a secure and firm national identity, the blatant ignoring of other demands of the Constitutional movement, such as the call for the formation of a society based on law and order, left the country still searching for a political identity.
^ abThomas De Waal, "The Caucasus: an introduction", Oxford University Press US, 2010. pp 87: "Soviet troops moved into Iranian, and a shored lived "Azerbaijan People's Government in Iran," led by the Iranian Azeri Communist Ja'far Pishevari, was set up in Tabriz in 1945–46. But the Soviet-backed puppet state collapsed in 1946 after Soviet forces withdrew, again under Western pressure.
^"As it turned out, the Soviets had to recognize that their ideas on Iran were premature. The issue of Iranian Azerbaijan became one of the opening skirmishes of the Cold War, and, largely under the Western powers' pressure, Soviet forces withdrew in 1946. The autonomous republic collapsed soon afterward, and the members of the Democratic Party took refuge in the Soviet Union, fleeing Iranian revenge. In Tabriz, the crowds that had just recently applauded the autonomous republic were now greeting the returning Iranian troops, and Azeri students publicly burned their native-language textbooks. The mass of the population was obviously not ready even for a regional self-government so long as it smacked of separatism". (Swietochowski, Tadeusz 1989. "Islam and the Growth of National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan", Kappeler, Andreas, Gerhard Simon, Georg Brunner eds. Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 46–60.)
^Белова Н. К. Об отходничестве из Северо-Западного Ирана в конце XIX – начале XX века // Вопросы истории. – М.: Изд-во "Правда", Октябрь 1956. – № 10. – С. 114
^Сумбатзаде А. С. Рост торгового земледелия в Азербайджане во второй половине XIX века (К вопросу о развитии российского капитализма вширь) // Вопросы истории. – М.: Изд-во "Правда", Апрель 1958. – № 4. – С. 123.
^"Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies", by David Menashri, Iranian Studies, 13:1–4 (1980) (retrieved 10 June 2006).
^National Bibliography Number: 2887141 / plan review and assess the country's culture indicators (indicators Ghyrsbty) {report}: Tehran Province / General Council of the Order of the Executive Director is responsible for planning and policy: Mansoor Vaezi; run company experienced researchers Us – ISBN978-600-6627-42-7 * Publication Status: Tehran – Institute Press book, published in 1391 * appearance: 296 p: table (the color), diagrams (colored part)
^For more information see: Ali Morshedizad, Roshanfekrane Azari va Hoviyate Melli va Ghomi (Azeri Intellectuals and Their Attitude to National and Ethnic Identity) (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz publishing co., 1380)
^Annika Rabo, Bo Utas, "The role of the state in West Asia", Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 2005. pg 156. Excerpt:"There is in fact, a considerable publication (book, newspaper, etc.) taking place in the two largest minority languages in the Azerbaijani language and Kurdish, and in the academic year 2004–05 B.A. programmes in the Azerbaijani language and literature (in Tabriz) and in the Kurdish language and literature (in Sanandaj) are offered in Iran for the very first time"
^Bulent Gokay, The Politics of Caspian Oil, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pg 30
^Richard Thomas, Roger East, Alan John Day,Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2002, pg 41
^Michael P. Croissant, "The Armenia–Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications", Praeger/Greenwood, 1998, pg 61
^ abElling, Christian (2013). Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 29.
^ abMirvahedi, Seyed Hadi, ed. (2019). The Sociolinguistics of Iran's Languages at Home and Abroad: The Case of Persian, Azerbaijani, and Kurdish. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 53.
^Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Editor), Culture and Learning in Islam, 2003, p. 282
^John Renard, Islam and the Heroic Image: Themes in Literature and the Visual Arts, 1999, Mercer University Press, p. 50.
^Feraydoon Adamyat, Andishe-ha-ye Mirza Fathali Akhondzadeh (The Thoughts of Mirza Fathali Akhondzadeh) (Tehran: Kharazmi Publications, 1970
^Bosworth, C. E. (1989). "AZERBAIJAN iv. Islamic History to 1941". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica, Volume III: Ātaš–Bayhaqī, Ẓahīr-al-Dīn. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 224–231. ISBN978-0-71009-121-5. Under the sixteen years' rule of Reżā Shah, Azerbaijan felt comparatively neglected, and use of the local language, Azeri Turkish, was forbidden for official purposes in favor of Persian.
^Asgharzadeh, Alireza (11 June 2007). Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles. Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 142, 143, 175, 176. In terms of linguistic exclusion and language-based oppression, it was in 1926 that for the first time the speaking of Azeri-Turkic became prohibited in Iranian and Azerbaijani schools. Reza Khan's handpicked chair of Cultural Office of Azerbaijan, a fellow named Dr. Mohseni, is well known for issuing the order: "Put donkey reins on whoever dares to speak Turkish in the classroom and throw them in the stable amongst the donkeys"
^Williams, Victoria R. (24 February 2020). Indigenous Peoples: An Encyclopedia of Culture, History, and Threats to Survival. ABC-CLIO. p. 125. The Azeri language is prohibited from schools in Iran.
^Lerman, Zvi; Sedik, David (15 February 2010). Rural Transition in Azerbaijan. Lexington Books. p. 12. The restriciton was formally abolished in 1979, but the Azeri population has not enjoyed much cultural freedom since the consolidation of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in 1983.
^اسلامی, عباس (December 25, 2000). یاسلی ساوالان. تبریز. Archived from the original on 2014-03-29.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
1 Central Asian (i.e. Turkmeni, Afghani and Iranian) Turkmens, distinct from Levantine (i.e. Iraqi and Syrian) Turkmen/Turkoman minorities, who mostly adhere to an Ottoman-Turkish heritage and identity.
2 In traditional areas of Turkish settlement (i.e. former Ottoman territories).