Montenegro and Serbia, the most advanced candidates, are expected to join earlier than the others.[2][3] Due to multiple factors, talks with Turkey are at an effective standstill.[4]
The accession criteria are included in the Copenhagen criteria, agreed in 1993, and the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49). Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty (as amended) says that any "European state" that respects the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law", may apply to join the EU. Whether a country is European or not is subject to political assessment by the EU institutions.[5]Past enlargement since the foundation of the European Union as the European Economic Community by the Inner Six states in 1958[6] brought total membership of the EU to twenty-eight, although as a result of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, the current number of EU member states is twenty-seven.
Of the four major western European countries that are not EU members, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland have submitted membership applications in the past but subsequently frozen or withdrawn them, while the United Kingdom is a former member. Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, as well as Liechtenstein, participate in the EU Single Market and also in the Schengen Area, which makes them closely aligned with the EU; none, however, are in the EU Customs Union.
Current agenda and applicants
The present enlargement agenda of the European Union regards three distinct groups of states:
These states must negotiate the terms of their EU accession with the current member states, and align their domestic legislation with EU law before joining.
There are other states in Europe that either seek membership or could potentially apply if their present foreign policy changes or the EU gives a signal that they might now be included on the enlargement agenda. However, these are not formally part of the current agenda, which is already delayed due to bilateral disputes in the Balkans and difficulty in fully implementing the acquis communautaire (the accepted body of EU law).
It was previously the norm for enlargements to see multiple entrants join the Union at once. The only previous enlargements of a single state were the 1981 admission of Greece and the 2013 admission of Croatia. However, the EU members have warned that, following the significant effect of the fifth enlargement in 2004, a more individual approach will be adopted in the future, although the entry of pairs or small groups of countries will most probably coincide.[7]
The European Union has made a commitment to accept the countries of the Western Balkans as full EU members
The 2003 European Council summit in Thessaloniki set the integration of the Western Balkans as a priority of EU expansion. This commitment was made in order to stabilise the region in the wake of the Yugoslav Wars, a series of ethnic wars through the 1990s that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Slovenia was the first former Yugoslav country to join the EU in 2004, followed by Croatia in 2013.
Serbia and Montenegro, the most advanced candidates in their negotiation processes with the EU, may join the EU sometime between 2025 and 2030.[12][3]
The European Council had endorsed starting negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia on 26 March 2020,[13] however, the negotiation process was blocked by Bulgaria for over two years.[14] In June 2022 French President Emmanuel Macron submitted a compromise proposal which, if adopted by both countries, would pave the way for the immediate adoption of negotiating frameworks for North Macedonia and Albania by the EU Council and for the organization of intergovernmental conferences with them.[15] On 24 June 2022, Bulgaria's parliament approved the revised French proposal to lift the country's veto on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia, with the Assembly of North Macedonia also doing so on 16 July 2022 allowing accession negotiations to begin. On the same day, the start of negotiations was set for 19 July 2022.[16]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations with Bosnia once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved.[17] On 12 March 2024, the European Commission recommended opening EU membership negotiations with Bosnia, citing the positive results from important reforms the country enacted.[18][19][20] On 21 March 2024, all 27 EU leaders, representing the European Council, gathered for a summit in Brussels, where they unanimously approved opening EU membership negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina.[21][22]
In 2005, the European Commission suggested in a strategy paper that the present enlargement agenda could potentially block the possibility of a future accession of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.[23]Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement between 2004 and 2010, said on the occasion that the EU should "avoid overstretching our capacity, and instead consolidate our enlargement agenda," adding, "this is already a challenging agenda for our accession process."[24]
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine ratified an Association Agreement with the EU, and the European Parliament passed a resolution in 2014 stating that "in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as any other European country, have a European perspective, can apply for EU membership in compliance with the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, minority rights and ensuring the rule of rights."[25] They also entered the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU, which creates "framework for modernising [...] trade relations and for economic development by the opening of markets via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and by an extensive harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations in various trade-related sectors, creating the conditions for aligning key sectors" of their economies with EU standards.[26] However, the EU did not expand further into the post-Soviet space in the 2010s.[27]
By January 2021, Georgia and Ukraine were preparing to formally apply for EU membership in 2024.[28][29][30] However, following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine submitted an application for EU membership on 28 February 2022, followed by Georgia and Moldova on 3 March 2022.[31][32] On 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, and recognized Georgia as a potential candidate for membership.[33] When taking its candidacy decision for Ukraine and Moldova, the Council made opening the accession negotiations conditional to addressing respectively seven and nine key areas related to strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption and improving governance processes.
In his speech in Moldova on 28 March 2023, President of the European Council Charles Michel mentioned that "by the end of the year, the Council will have to decide on the opening negotiations with [Ukraine and Moldova]. It will be a political decision taking into account the report that will be published by the Commission. And I sincerely hope that a positive decision will be possible by the end of the year".[34]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine, and granting candidate status to Georgia.[17]
On 14 December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant the candidate status to Georgia.[35]
Turkey's candidacy to join the EU has been a matter of major significance and considerable controversy since it was granted in 1999. Turkey has had historically close ties with the EU, having an association agreement since 1964,[36] being in a customs union with the EU since 1995 and initially applying to join in 1987. Only after a summit in Brussels on 17 December 2004 (following the major 2004 enlargement) did the European Council announce that membership negotiations with Turkey were officially opened on 3 October 2005.
However, others, such as former French PresidentNicolas Sarkozy and former German ChancellorAngela Merkel, opposed Turkey's membership. Opponents argue that Turkey does not respect the key principles that are expected in a liberal democracy, such as the freedom of expression.[40] Turkey's large population would also alter the balance of power in the representative European institutions. Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 84 million inhabitants would bestow it the largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. It would become the most populous country in the EU.[41]
Another problem is that Turkey does not recognise one EU state, Cyprus, because of the Cyprus problem and the Cypriot government blocks some chapters of Turkey's talks.
On 26 July 2016, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced that Turkey's EU membership process would come to an end if the death penalty was returned in Turkey.[42]
Turkey's relations with the EU have seriously deteriorated in the aftermath of the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt and subsequent purges.[43][44] On 24 November 2016, the European Parliament approved a non-binding resolution calling for the "temporary freeze of the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey" over human rights and rule of law concerns.[45][46][47] On 6 July 2017, the European Parliament accepted the call for the suspension of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey.[48] On 13 December, the European Council (comprising the heads of state or government of the member states) resolved that it would open no new areas in Turkey's membership talks in the "prevailing circumstances",[49] as Turkey's path toward autocratic rule made progress on EU accession impossible.[50] On 13 March 2019, the European Parliament accepted the call for a halt to the full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey.[51] As of 2022, and especially following Erdoğan's victory in the constitutional referendum, Turkish accession talks are effectively at a standstill.[4][52][53] However, in July 2023, Erdoğan brought up Turkey's accession to EU membership up in the context of Sweden's application for NATO membership.[54]
However, in September 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that the European Union was well into a rupture in its relations with Turkey and that they could part ways during Turkey's European Union membership process.[55]
Accession negotiations with Montenegro were opened in June 2012. All 33 applicable negotiating chapters have been opened, of which 3 have been provisionally closed.[58]
Every chapter must be closed to conclude the negotiations.
Accession negotiations with North Macedonia were opened in July 2022.[57] None of the 33 applicable negotiating chapters have been opened or closed yet.
North Macedonia needs to implement constitutional changes according to the Council conclusions of July 2022 to complete the opening phase of the negotiations.[59]
Accession negotiations with Serbia were opened in January 2014. Out of 34 applicable negotiating chapters, 22 have been opened, of which 2 have been provisionally closed.[60]
Every chapter must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations.
The European Council decided in March 2024 to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.[61]
The European Commission needs to prepare a negotiating framework for adoption by the Council, the moment all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022 have been taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina.[62]
The European Council decided in December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Moldova.[35]
The European Commission needs to prepare a negotiating framework for adoption by the Council once the Commission recommendations of November 2023 are addressed,[59] which is expected to take place in June 2024.[63][64]
The European Council decided in December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine.[35]
The European Commission needs to prepare a negotiating framework for adoption by the Council once the Commission recommendations of November 2023 are addressed,[59] which is expected to take place in June 2024.[63][64]
Accession negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005. Out of 33 applicable negotiating chapters, 16 have been opened, of which 1 has been provisionally closed.[65]
Turkey's accession negotiations are frozen and, under the current circumstances, no further chapters are being considered for opening or closing.[65] The European Parliament committee voted to suspend accession negotiations in 2019.[66][67] On 18 July 2023, the EU decided not to restart full membership negotiations with Turkey.[68]
^Montenegro started negotiations in November 2005 while a part of Serbia and Montenegro. Separate technical negotiations were conducted regarding issues of sub-state organizational competency. A mandate for direct negotiations with Montenegro was established in July 2006. Direct negotiations were initiated on 26 September 2006 and concluded on 1 December 2006.[69]
^Serbia started negotiations in November 2005 while part of Serbia and Montenegro, with a modified mandate from July 2006.
Level of preparation for acquis chapters
Current situation
The table below shows the level of preparation of applicant countries for adopting the acquis communautaire, on a scale from 1 to 5 points, according to the data of the 2023 reports of the European Commission processed by European Pravda:[113]
Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights
2.5
3
2.5
2
2
2
2
2
1.5
1
24. Justice, freedom and security
2.5
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1.5
3
5. Public procurement
3
3.5
3
3
2
2
2
2
2.5
3
18. Statistics
3
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
2
3
32. Financial control
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
2
4
Cluster 2: Internal Market
1. Free movement of goods
2.5
3
3
3
1
2
2
3
2.5
4
2. Freedom of movement for workers
2
2
1
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3
3
3
3
1
3
2
2
3
1
4. Free movement of capital
3
3
3
3
3
3
2.5
2.5
3
3
6. Company law
3
4
4
4
2
2
1.5
2
2
5
7. Intellectual property law
3
4
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
4
8. Competition policy
2.5
3
3
3
2
1
2
2
2
2
9. Financial services
3.5
3
3
3
2.5
2
2
2
3
4
28. Consumer and health protection
1
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
1
4
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth
10. Digital transformation and media
3
3
3
3
1
2
2
3.5
2
2
16. Taxation
3
3
3
3
2
2.5
2
2
2
3
17. Economic and monetary policy
3.5
3
3.5
3.5
1
3
2
3
3
2
19. Social policy and employment
3
2
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
2
20. Enterprise and industrial policy
3
3.5
3
3
1
3
2
2
3
3
25. Science and research
2
4
4
4
2
3
3
3
1
5
26. Education and culture
3
4
3
4
1
3
2
2
2
3
29. Customs union
3
3
4
4
2
3
2.5
4
3
4
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity
14. Transport
2
3.5
3
4
2
2
2
2
1
3
15. Energy
3.5
4
3
3
1
2
2.5
4
2
3
21. Trans-European networks
2
3.5
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
5
27. Environment and climate change
2
2
2
2
1.5
1
1
2
1
2
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion
11. Agriculture and rural development
2
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
2
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
2.5
2
13. Fisheries and aquaculture
3
2
3
3
1
2
1
2
1
3
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
3
3
3
3
1
1.5
1
2
1
3
33. Financial and budgetary provisions
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
Cluster 6: External relations
30. External relations
4
4
3
3
2
3
3
4
1
3
31. Foreign, security and defence policy
4
4
4
3
2
3
3.5
4
2
Other chapters
34. Institutions
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
Nothing to negotiate
35. Other issues
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
Nothing to negotiate
Average level
2.7
3.1
3
3
1.7
2.1
1.9
2.3
2
2.9
5 Well advanced
4.5 Good / Well advanced
4 Good level of preparation
3.5 Moderate / Good
3 Moderately prepared
2.5 Some / Moderate
2 Some level of preparation
1.5 Early stage / Some
1 Early stage
Change over the last year
The table below shows the change in the level of preparation of applicant countries for adopting the acquis communautaire over the last year, according to the data of the 2023 reports of the European Commission, processed by European Pravda:[113]
Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights
2.5
3
2.5
2
2
2
2
2
1.5
1
24. Justice, freedom and security
2.5
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1.5
3
5. Public procurement
3
3.5
3
3
2
2
2
2
2.5
3
18. Statistics
3
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
2
3
32. Financial control
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
2
4
Cluster 2: Internal Market
1. Free movement of goods
2.5
3
3
3
1
2
2
3
2.5
4
2. Freedom of movement for workers
2
2
1
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3
3
3
3
1
3
2
2
3
1
4. Free movement of capital
3
3
3
3
3
3
2.5
2.5
3
3
6. Company law
3
4
4
4
2
2
1.5
2
2
5
7. Intellectual property law
3
4
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
4
8. Competition policy
2.5
3
3
3
2
1
2
2
2
2
9. Financial services
3.5
3
3
3
2.5
2
2
2
3
4
28. Consumer and health protection
1
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
1
4
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth
10. Digital transformation and media
3
3
3
3
1
2
2
3.5
2
2
16. Taxation
3
3
3
3
2
2.5
2
2
2
3
17. Economic and monetary policy
3.5
3
3.5
3.5
1
3
2
3
3
2
19. Social policy and employment
3
2
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
2
20. Enterprise and industrial policy
3
3.5
3
3
1
3
2
2
3
3
25. Science and research
2
4
4
4
2
3
3
3
1
5
26. Education and culture
3
4
3
4
1
3
2
2
2
3
29. Customs union
3
3
4
4
2
3
2.5
4
3
4
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity
14. Transport
2
3.5
3
4
2
2
2
2
1
3
15. Energy
3.5
4
3
3
1
2
2.5
4
2
3
21. Trans-European networks
2
3.5
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
5
27. Environment and climate change
2
2
2
2
1.5
1
1
2
1
2
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion
11. Agriculture and rural development
2
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
2
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
2.5
2
13. Fisheries and aquaculture
3
2
3
3
1
2
1
2
1
3
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
3
3
3
3
1
1.5
1
2
1
3
33. Financial and budgetary provisions
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
Cluster 6: External relations
30. External relations
4
4
3
3
2
3
3
4
1
3
31. Foreign, security and defence policy
4
4
4
3
2
3
3.5
4
2
Other chapters
34. Institutions
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
Nothing to negotiate
35. Other issues
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
Nothing to negotiate
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
Nothing to negotiate
Total change
+3.5
+0.5
+0.5
+0.5
0
+1
+6.5
+4
+4
0
3 Change by 1 point
3 Change by 0.5 points
3 No change
Evaluation of actions over the past year
The table below shows the assessment of the actions of the candidate countries over the last year, according to the data of the 2023 reports of the European Commission, processed by European Pravda:[113]
The Maastricht Treaty (Article 49) states that any European country (as defined by a European Council assessment) that is committed to democracy may apply for membership in the European Union.[124] In addition to European states, other countries have also been speculated or proposed as future members of the EU.
Sovereign states
States in Europe that have chosen, for various reasons, not to join the EU have integrated with it to different extents according to their circumstances. Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein participate directly in the single market via the EEA, Switzerland does so via bilateral treaties and the other European microstates (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City) have specific agreements with the EU and neighbouring countries, including their use of the euro as their currency. Most of these countries are also part of the Schengen Area. Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland have all previously had live applications to join the EU, which have been withdrawn or otherwise frozen. Such applications could be resubmitted in the event of a change in the political landscape.
On 5 March 2024, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia would apply for EU candidacy by autumn 2024 at the latest.[125] On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming Armenia meets Maastricht TreatyArticle 49 requirements and that the country may apply for EU membership.[126] At the 2024 Copenhagen Democracy Summit, Pashinyan stated that he would like Armenia to become a member of the European Union "This year."[127]
Canada is a non-European country with values, culture, trade, and politics closely linked with the EU. Its membership has been proposed due to this.[166] See: Canada–European Union relations.
Internal enlargement is the process of new member states arising from the break-up of an existing member state.[168][169][170] There have been and are a number of active separatist movements within member states (for example in Catalonia and Flanders) but there are no clear agreements, treaties or precedents covering the scenario of an existing EU member state breaking into two or more states, both of which wish to remain EU member states. The question is whether one state is a successor and one a new applicant or, alternatively, both are new states which must be admitted to the EU.[171][172]
In some cases, a region desires to leave its state and the EU, namely those regions wishing to join Switzerland. But most, namely the two movements that held referendums during the 2010s, Scotland and Catalonia, see their future as independent states within the EU. This results in great interest in whether, once independent, they would retain EU membership or conversely whether they would have to re-apply. In the later case, since new members must be approved unanimously, any other state which has an interest in blocking their membership to deter similar independence movements could do so.[173][174] Additionally, it is unclear whether the successor state would retain any opt-outs that the parent state was entitled to.
Opinions on membership
European Commission
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission (2014-2019): "If there were to be a 'yes' vote in favour of Catalan independence, then we will respect that opinion. But Catalonia will not be able to be an EU member state on the day after such a vote."[175] This was repeated in October in an official press release: "We [...] reiterate the legal position held by this Commission as well as by its predecessors. If a referendum were to be organised in line with the Spanish Constitution it would mean that the territory leaving would find itself outside of the European Union."[176]
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission (2004-2014), stated in 2012 in the context of the 2014 referendum for independence in Scotland, that any newly independent country would have to apply for membership and negotiate its terms, but that the rest of the original country would not have to re-negotiate its position and would continue its membership.[177][178] In 2014 he said that it would have been 'very difficult' for an independent Scotland to join the EU, 'if not impossible', because of the difficulty of getting the approval of all member states, particularly Spain, which fears a possible secession of Catalonia and has blocked Kosovo's accession to the EU.[179]
Joaquín Almunia (Spanish, being at the time an EU Commissioner) in 2013 claimed that Catalonia would have to apply for EU membership in the event of secession from Spain.[180]
Government of Spain
Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, said in November 2013 that an independent Scotland's entry to the EU would require the consent of all existing members and that an independent Scotland or other regions gaining independence, taken as a reference to Catalonia, would end up outside of the EU.[181][182]
Spanish Foreign Minister José García-Margallo, having said in February 2012 that Spain would not veto Scottish accession to the EU, provided Scottish independence had UK agreement (thus making it different from Catalan independence).[183]
The presence of a strong Basque Nationalist movement, strongly majoritary in several territories of the Basque Country, makes possible the future existence of an independent Basque Country under different potential territorial configurations. In overall terms the Basque nationalism is pro-European.
On 1 October 2017, the Catalan government held a referendum on independence, which had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Spain, with potential polling stations being cordoned off by riot police. The subsequent events constituted a political crisis for Catalonia. The EU's position is to keep distance from the crisis while supporting Spain's territorial integrity and constitution.[184][185] While the debate around Scotland's referendum may inform the Catalan crisis, Catalonia is in a distinct situation from Scotland whereby the central government does not recognise the legitimacy of any independence declaration from Catalonia. If Spain does not recognise the independence of a Catalan state, Catalonia cannot separately join the EU and it is still recognised as part of Spain's EU membership.
Corsica has a strong and electorally successful nationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence, the latter option with around 10–15% public support.[186] The independist party Corsica Libera envisions an independent Corsica within the European Union as a union of various European peoples, as well as recommendations for alignment within European directives.[187]
According to a 2012 survey conducted in a joint effort between the University of Cagliari and that of Edinburgh,[192][193][194] 41% of Sardinians would be in favour of independence (with 10% choosing it from both Italy and the European Union, and 31% only from Italy with Sardinia remaining in the EU), whilst another 46% would rather have a larger autonomy within Italy and the EU, including fiscal power; 12% of people would be content to remain part of Italy and the EU with a Regional Council without any fiscal powers, and 1% in Italy and the EU without a Regional Council and fiscal powers.[195][196][197][198][199][200][201] A 2017 poll by the Ixè Institute found that 51% of those questioned identified as Sardinian (as opposed to an Italian average of 15% identifying by their region of origin), rather than Italian (19%), European (11%) and/or citizen of the world (19%).[202][203]
Sardinian nationalists address a number of issues, such as the environmental damage caused by the military forces[204][205][206][207][208][209][210][211][212] (about 60% of such bases in Italy are located on the island),[213] the financial and economic exploitation of the island's resources by the Italian state and mainland industrialists,[214] the lack of any political representation both in Italy and in the European Parliament[215][216] (due to an unbalanced electoral constituency that still remains to this day,[217] Sardinia has not had its own MEP since 1994),[218] the nuclear power and waste (on which a referendum was proposed by a Sardist party,[219] being held in 2011[220]) and the ongoing process of depopulation and Italianization that would destroy the Sardinian indigenous culture.[221]
Similarly to Sardinia, Veneto has a strong and electorally successful nationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence. In the 2014 independence referendum, an online unofficial referendum, 89% of participants were in favour of Veneto becoming "a federal, independent and sovereign state" and 55% supported accession to European Union membership.[222] Three years later, in the 2017 autonomy referendum, with a 58% turnout, 98% of Venetians voted in favour of "further forms and special conditions of autonomy to be attributed to the Region of Veneto".[223] Consequently, negotiations between the Venetian government and the Italian one started.
The longstanding and largest Venetist party, Liga Veneta (LV), was established in 1979 under the slogan "farther from Rome, closer to Europe",[224] but has later adopted more Eurosceptic positions. Luca Zaia, a LV member who has served as president of Veneto since 2010, usually self-describes as a pro-Europeanist and has long advocated for a "Europe of regions" and "macro-regions".[225][226][227][228]
Opinion polls in both Moldova and Romania show significant support for the unification of the two countries, based on their reciprocal historical and cultural ties.[232][233] Such a scenario would result in Moldova becoming part of an enlarged Romania and therefore receiving the benefits and obligations of the latter's EU membership.[234] An obstacle would be the existence of the breakaway Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria), which is considered by Moldova and most of the international community to be de jure part of Moldova's sovereign territory but is de facto independent. Transnistria's absence of strong historical or cultural links to Romania and its close political and military relationship with Russia have been seen as major hurdles to integration of the region with both Romania and the EU.[233] Another likely barrier from within Moldova would be opposition on the part of the autonomous territory of Gagauzia, whose population has been mostly against integration with Romania since at least the 1990s.[235] A 2014 referendum held by the Gagauzian government showed both overwhelming support for the region joining the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Union and a similar level of rejection to closer ties with the EU.[236]
Possible incorporation of special member state territories
There are multiple special member state territories, some of which are not fully covered by the EU treaties and apply EU law only partially, if at all. It is possible for a dependency to change its status regarding the EU or some particular treaty or law provision. The territory may change its status from participation to leaving or from being outside to joining.
The Faroe Islands, a self-governing nation within the Kingdom of Denmark, is not part of the EU, as explicitly asserted by both Rome treaties.[237] The relations with the EU are governed by a Fisheries Agreement (1977) and a Free Trade Agreement (1991, revised 1998). The main reason for remaining outside the EU is disagreements about the Common Fisheries Policy,[238] which disfavours countries with large fish resources. Also, every member has to pay for the Common Agricultural Policy, which favours countries having much agriculture which the Faroe Islands does not. When Iceland was in membership negotiations around 2010, there was a hope of better conditions for fish-rich countries[citation needed], but to no avail. The Common Fisheries Policy was introduced in 1970 for the very reason of getting access for the first EC members to waters of candidate countries, namely the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark including the Faroe Islands[citation needed].
Nevertheless, there are politicians, mainly in the right-wing Union Party (Sambandsflokkurin), led by their chairman Kaj Leo Johannesen, who would like to see the Faroes as a member of the EU. However, the chairman of the left-wing Republic (Tjóðveldi), Høgni Hoydal, has expressed concerns that if the Faroes were to join the EU as is, they might vanish inside the EU, comparing this with the situation of the Shetland Islands and Åland today, and wants the local government to solve the political situation between the Faroes and Denmark first.[239]
Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and became part of the EEC (the predecessor entity of the EU) when Denmark joined in 1973. After the establishment of Greenland's home rule in 1979, which made it an autonomous community, Greenland held a referendum on EEC membership. The result was (mainly because of the Common Fisheries Policy) to leave, so on 1 February 1985, Greenland left the EEC and EURATOM. Its status was changed to that of an Overseas Country.[240][241] Danish nationals residing in Greenland (i.e. all native population) are nonetheless fully European citizens; they are not, however, entitled to vote in European elections.
There has been some speculation as to whether Greenland may consider rejoining the now-European Union. On 4 January 2007, the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten quoted the former Danish minister for Greenland, Tom Høyem, as saying "I would not be surprised if Greenland again becomes a member of the EU... The EU needs the Arctic window and Greenland cannot alone manage the gigantic Arctic possibilities".[242] Greenland has a lot of natural resources, and Greenland has, especially during the 2000s commodities boom, contracted foreign private companies to exploit some of them, but the cost is considered too high, as Greenland is remote and severely lacks infrastructure which has to be built. After 2013 prices declined so such efforts stalled.
The Brexit debate has reignited talk about the EU in Greenland with calls for the island to join the Union again.[243]
When Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba were established as Dutch public bodies after the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles (which was an OCT) in 2010, their status within the EU was raised. Rather than change their status from an OCT to an outermost region, as their change in status within the Netherlands would imply, it was decided that their status would remain the same for at least five years. After those five years, their status would be reviewed.[needs update]
New Caledonia is an overseas part of France with its own unique status under the French Constitution, which is distinct from that of overseas departments and collectivities. It is defined as an "overseas country" under the 1998 Nouméa Accord, and enjoys a high degree of self-government.[245] Currently, in regard to the EU, it is one of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT).
As a result of the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonians voted in three consecutive independence referendums in 2018, 2020, and 2021. The referendums were to determine whether the territory would remain a part of the French Republic as a "sui generis collectivity", or whether it would become an independent state. The accords also specify a gradual devolution of powers to the local New Caledonian assembly. The results of all three referendums determined that New Caledonia would remain a part of the French Republic.
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^"Über Uns". Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland official website. Archived from the original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved 4 April 2016.
^Holehouse, Matthew (16 February 2014). "Jose Manuel Barroso: nearly impossible for Scotland to join EU". Sunday Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 20 September 2020. Retrieved 4 September 2014. Spain, which fears the separation of the Catalonia region, has blocked the accession of Kosovo ... Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission ... went on: 'It will be extremely difficult to get the approval of all the other member states to have a new member coming from one member state.' 'We have seen that Spain has been opposing even the recognition of Kosovo, for instance. It's to some extent a similar case because it's a new country, and so I believe it's going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.'
^"Scottish independence: Spain warning over EU entry". The Scotsman. Edinburgh. 3 February 2014. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 20 November 2019. 'They have to resolve a mountain of problems, as Better Together has explained very well,' he said.'You have to achieve candidate status. You have to negotiate 35 chapters . It has to be ratified by the institutions of the EU. It then has to be ratified by 28 national parliaments.'
^<<In chiave antimilitarista, nel quadro del tradizionale attivismo contestativo contro la presenza di strutture militari sul territorio nazionale, a fronte del tono minore che ha caratterizzato l'impegno dei comitati siciliani contro il sistema satellitare MUOS, si è rilevato un innalzamento della tensione mobilitativa in Sardegna, ove espressioni dell'antagonismo e dell'indipendentismo sardo hanno rivitalizzato la protesta contro le esercitazioni nei poligoni e nelle installazioni militari dell'Isola, reclamando la smilitarizzazione del territorio.>> Relazione sulla politica dell'informazione per la sicurezza, pg.69
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