¹ — Involved an Allied convoy or delivery mission
² — Involved an Axis convoy or delivery mission
The Raid on Alexandria (Operazione EA 3) was carried out on 19 December 1941 by Italian Navy (Regia Marina) divers of the Decima Flottiglia MAS (Decima Flottiglia Motoscafi Armati Siluranti [10th Flotilla MAS]), who attacked and sank two Royal Navy battleships at their moorings and damaged an oil tanker and a destroyer in the harbour of Alexandria, Egypt, using manned torpedoes.
The attacks came at a difficult time for the Mediterranean Fleet, after the loss of the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and the battleship Barham to U-boats, the loss of ships during the Battle of Crete and the sinking of much of Force K on an Italian minefield, the day before the human torpedo attack on Alexandria. Ships also had to be sent to the Eastern Fleet.
The interest of the Regia Marina in small boat warfare lay dormant between 1918 and the diplomatic crisis with Britain over the Second Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–1936. In 1935 and early 1936, Captain Teseo Tesei and Captain Elios Toschi tested a human torpedo in La Spezia on the Tyrrhenian Sea and resumed testing in May. The Ethiopian defeat in 1936 ended the tests but work on assault boats continued. On 28 September 1938, Supermarina ordered the I Flottiglia MAS (1st Torpedo Motorboat Flotilla), based at La Spezia, to establish a research department (the Sezione Armi Speciali (Special Weapons Section) from 1939. The detachment had a few officers at HQ, seven at a confidential base at Bocca di Serchio for human torpedo and frogman training and another six officers to pilot the assault motorboats, of which seven had been built, plus eleven human torpedoes.[1]
On 24 February 1940, the 1st MAS Flotilla and the Special Weapons Section was taken over by Commander Mario Giorgini and in August attempts to use the unconventional weapons began, with little success and the capture of Giorgini in October. On 23 January 1941 Commander Vittorio Moccagatta replaced Giorgini and on 15 March formed the Decima Flottiglia Motoscafi Armati Siluranti (10th Torpedo Motorboat Flotilla, Decima MAS). The new force had a HQ, including a plans office and a weapons section. The surface assault boats and the training school (Lieutenant-Commander Giorgio Giobbe) were split from the human torpedoes and other underwater weapons (Lieutenant-Commander Junio Valerio Borghese) , the captain of the Italian submarine Scirè. Decima MAS remained at La Spezia and an advanced base was set up in Augusta, Sicily.[2]
The Siluro lenta corsa (SLC, slow speed torpedo), known as a Maiale (pig), was designed by Tesei and
Toschi during 1935 and 1936. By late 1939 about eleven were ready and in July 1940 the production version, Series 100, began to arrive. In 1941 the improved Series 200 became ready for use. The standard 533 mm (21.0 in) torpedo with double propellers was changed to one larger propeller in a cowling; seats for a two-man crew were installed, with shields housing the controls. The SLC weighed 1.3–1.4 long tons (1.3–1.4 t) and was 22–24 ft (6.7–7.3 m) long. The 1.6 hp (1.2 kW) electric motor moved the maiale at 2–3 nmi (3.7–5.6 km; 2.3–3.5 mi) at a maximum depth of 50 ft (15 m). At the target the crew detached a 6 ft (1.8 m)-long warhead with 510 to 570 lb (230 to 260 kg) of explosive, detonated by a timer. The maiale crews the Gamma frogmen wore Belloni rubberised suits with a closed-circuit re-breathing apparatus to avoid bubbles. The Gamma frogmen carried explosive charges, five 9.9 lb (4.5 kg) cimici (bedbugs) or two 26 lb (12 kg) bauletti, (little trunks) and attached them to a ship's hull, with a timed detonation.[3][a]
Motoscafo trasporto lento (MTL)
Container for a maiale to be attached to the deck of a submarine
Maiali and SLCs needed transport close to the target because the re-breather lasted no more than six hours and maiali had a range of only 4 nmi (7.4 km; 4.6 mi) at full speed and a maximum of 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) at cruising speed.[3] The modified destroyers Francesco Crispi and Quintino Sella, had carried the MTM used in the successful Raid on Souda Bay (25/26 March 1941). The Motoscafo trasporto lento (MTL, slow transport motorboat) was a wooden-hulled boat 28 ft (8.5 m) long by 9 ft 6 in (2.9 m) wide, to carry maiali close to the target. The MTL had a range of only 60 nmi (110 km; 69 mi) cruising at 5 kn (9.3 km/h; 5.8 mph), few were built and they were rarely used. Surface transport gave way to submarines; early in 1940 the Italian submarine Ametista began tests as a maiale transport. The maximum depth of submersion was only 98 ft (30 m); Italian submarine Iride was converted in July 1940 but was sunk on 21 August. Italian submarine Gondar was sunk on 30 September, even though the three maiali cylinders could be flooded, allowing the boat to reach a depth of 295 ft (90 m).[5]
Motoscafo turismo (MT/MTM)
MTM of Decima MAS
The first Motoscafo turismo (MT) became known as barchini (little boats) were guilt in late 1938, six MT being delivered in early 1939. An improved version MT Modificato (MTM) tested in November 1940, was 20 ft (6.1 m) long. Both types carried an explosive charge of 660–730 lb (300–330 kg) in the bows at up to 31 kn (57 km/h; 36 mph). The MTM was fitted with a seat back/life raft behind the pilot for him to float on after dropping off the MTM, while waiting to be rescued. Twelve MTs were built and about forty MTMs. Early in 1941, a smaller MT Ridotto was built with a height of 3 ft 9 in (1.14 m) to fit inside the deck cylinders of submarines with the same explosive charge but they were never used in this manner.[6]
The MT Siluranti (MTS, torpedo motorboat), was a small boat carrying one or two modified 450 mm (18 in) torpedoes, the MTS being more manoeuvrable than the usual Motoscafo armato silurante. The first MTS, of early 1941, could reach 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph) with a range of 85 nmi (158 km). The Decima MAS was assisted by Regia Marina MAS boats, which by June
1940, had fifty Class 500 MAS and another 25 in 1941 in four versions. The Class 500 was 61 ft (18.7 m) long by 15 ft (4.7 m) wide at the beam, with a displacement of 21.7–28.9 long tons; 24.3–32.4 short tons (22–29.4 t). The MAS had a crew of 9 to 13 men and had two 18 in (450 mm) torpedoes, 6–10 depth charges and a 13.2 mm (0.52 in) heavy machine-gun (replaced in 1941 with a Breda 20 mm cannon). The MAS could move at 44 kn (81 km/h; 51 mph) and had a range of 348–864 nmi (645–1,600 km).
List of decima MAS equipment
Decima MAS equipment (Data from Crociani and Battistelli [2013])[7]
The British code-breakers of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC & CS) alerted Admiral Andrew Cunningham the commander in chief of the Mediterranean Fleet before 17 December 1942, that its decodes of Italian messages encyphered on the Italian C 38m machine, showed that Supermarina, the Italian naval staff, had some interest in the port of Alexandria but without details.[8] Torpedo nets were set up around the battleships HMS Valiant and Queen Elizabeth and other precautions were taken.[9] On the day, Cunningham was told that an Italian reconnaissance aircraft had reported that Valiant and Queen Elizabeth were at their moorings and that the sea was calm, an unusual item to report. On 18 December GC & CS reported that the reconnaissance was urgent; Cunningham and his staff issued an alert at 10:25 a.m. that
Attacks on Alexandria by air, boat or human torpedo may be expected when calm weather prevails. Look-outs and patrols should be warned accordingly.[8]
On the night of 18/19 December, 1.3 mi (1.1 nmi; 2.1 km) from Alexandria commercial (eastern) harbour, Scirè released the maiali at a depth of 15 m (49 ft) about 5 nmi (9.3 km; 5.8 mi) from the naval anchorage. The maiali reached the harbour and entered the naval base when the British opened the boom gate to let in three destroyers. The frogmen were shaken by the explosive charges being dropped in the harbour by patrol craft. The maiali crews found it comparatively easy to get over the torpedo nets around the battleships but attaching a charge to Valiant from its bilge keels and the crew dropped the explosive onto the sea bed about 15 ft (4.6 m) below the ship. Marceglia and Schergat planted their bomb 5 ft (1.5 m) beneath the keel of Queen Elizabeth, found it much easier and suspended the charge from the bilge keels as planned. The maiali crew who attacked Valiant were discovered holding on to the mooring buoy but gave nothing away when questioned.[12]
The prisoners were assumed to have already planted a bomb and were detained in a room near the bottom of the ship. At 5:47 a.m. an explosion under the rear of the tanker Sagona (7,554 GRT) did severe damage to the ship and to the destroyer Jervis oiling alongside. At 5:50 a.m. one of the prisoners on Valiant asked to see the captain and told him that the ship was going to blow up and fifteen minutes later there was an explosion under Valiant's fore turrets. Four minutes after the explosion under Valiant there was another explosion, this time under Queen Elizabeth, near its boiler rooms. There were eight casualties and the battleships were put out of action. The crews of the other two maiali got ashore and tried to reach the submarine Zaffiro, due to meet them off Rosetta but were captured over the next 48 hours.[13][b]
Aftermath
Analysis
Where the Italian fleet had failed, six sailors had succeeded.[15][c] In 1957 the Italian historian and Admiral Marcantonio Bragadin (retired) wrote,
Consequently, the Alexandria Fleet remained for many months without any battleships, and it was forced to abandon any further open activity. In fact, Admiral Cunningham wrote that his Fleet now ′should have to leave it to the Royal Air Force to try if they could dispute the control of the Central Mediterranean with the enemy's fleet.′ .... In fact, it opened a period of clear Italian naval supremacy in the east-central Mediterranean.[15]
Cunningham reported to Sir Dudley Pound, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that the result was a disaster. It was fortunate that a junior officer suggested that ships should keep their propellers turning slowly in reverse, creating a strong enough current to frustrate a swimmer. The idea was adopted, Cunningham remarking, "It is a pity we did not think of it before". To maintain appearances, Cunningham remained on board Queen Elizabeth keeping the usual routines going, marine bands parading, the ceremonies of the morning colours and sunset continuing.[17]
The recent loss of HMS Ark Royal and Barham to U-boats, the sinking of much of Force K (1941) on an Italian minefield, on top of the losses during the Battle of Crete and having to send ships to reinforce the Eastern Fleet, reduced the Mediterranean Fleet to a force of light cruisers and destroyers.[18] Decodes from the Italian C 38m made it practical for the Admiralty to keep the extent of the damage to Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, which was not apparent to air reconnaissance, along with the loss of Barham until late January 1942 when a prisoner mentioned the success at Alexandria, leading to the Italians making the most of this by sailing more convoys.[19] The coup at Alexandria neutralised the main remaining capital ships of the Mediterranean Fleet at a stroke. Along with transfers to the Eastern Fleet, it meant that the only ships left at Alexandria larger than a destroyer were the cruisers HMS Naiad, Dido and Euryalus. The Italian battle fleet had four battleships operational and grounds for confidence in the future; the deception to conceal the extent of the damage of Valiant and Queen Elizabeth could not last for long.[18]
HMS Valiant
The explosive charge under Valiant was under the port torpedo bulge near A turret, holing the lower bulge and blowing the hole upwards over 60 ft × 30 ft (18.3 m × 9.1 m). The internal damage was spread from the keel to the lower bulge compartments, with flooding in the double-bottom bulge, A shell room and magazine and the compartments next to it up to the lower deck. Shock caused some damage to electrical equipment and the traversing mechanism for A turret was distorted. The main and auxiliary machinery were undamaged and the ship could to put to sea if necessary. As many items as possible were taken off the ship to lighten it and then it was moved to Admiralty Floating Dock No. 5 on 21 December for temporary repairs; on 3 April 1942 she sailed to Durban for permanent repairs from 15 April to 7 July 1942.[20]
HMS Queen Elizabeth
The explosion that disabled Queen Elizabeth was under B boiler room, damaging the double bottom and anti-torpedo bulges over 190 ft × 60 ft (58 m × 18 m). The floor of B boiler room and those of A and X boiler rooms, to a limited extent, were forced upwards. The boiler rooms, the forward 4.5-inch magazines, Y boiler room and many other compartments were flooded up to the main deck, damaging boilers, machinery and other electrical equipment. The main and secondary armament remained operational but hydraulic power was lost. Queen Elizabeth took electrical current from submarines moored on either side.[17] The ship was put into a floating dock for temporary repairs and then during the panic after the defeat at the Battle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June 1942) Queen Elizabeth sailed to Port Sudan in the Red Sea on 5 May The fuel tanks were repaired and fuel taken on for a journey to the US and in mid-July Queen Elizabeth sailed for the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Virginia. Queen Elizabeth underwent permanent repairs from 6 September to 1 June 1943, a period of nearly eighteen months.[20]
Sagona and HMS Jervis
Sagona was towed back to England and repairs took until 1946 to be completed. Jervis required a month in dock to make repairs.[21]
^Students at the Gamma training school, which began in September 1940, had a stringent ten-month course; about fifty graduates undertook operations during the war.[4]
^Queen Elizabeth had a draught of 33ft 5in forward and 32ft 7in aft, after the explosion its draught was 41ft 10in forward, 33ft 10in aft. Queen Elizabeth was moored in approximately 48ft (8 fathoms) of water.[14]
^After the war, when the frogmen were released from British captivity, the former captain of Valiant, now Admiral Charles Morgan, Chief of the Allied Naval Mission in Italy, asked for the privilege of giving the Gold Medal of Military Valor (Medaglia d'oro al valor militare) to Durand de la Penne.[16]
Brown, David (2002). The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: November 1940 – December 1941. Vol. II. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN0-7146-5205-9.
Crociani, Piero; Battistelli, Pier Paolo (2013). Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces1940–45. Elite (No. 191) (ePub ed.). Oxford: Osprey. ISBN978-1-78096-372-3.
Greene, J.; Massignani, A. (2002) [1998]. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (repr. pbk. ed.). Rochester: Chatham. ISBN978-1-86176-190-3.
Hinsley, Harry; Thomas, E. E.; Ransom, C. F. G.; Knight, R. C. (1981). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War. Vol. II. London: HMSO. ISBN0-521-242908.
Playfair, I. S. O.; Flynn, F. C.; Molony, C. J. C.; Gleave, T. P. (2004) [1960]. Butler, Sir James (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III (facs. pbk. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN978-1-84574-067-2.
Raven, Alan; Roberts, John (1975). "Queen Elizabeth class battleships". Ensign 4. London: Bivouac Books. ISBN978-0-85680-005-4.
Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN1-86176-257-7.
Sadkovich, James (1994). The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. ISBN0-313-28797-X.
Woodman, Richard (2003). Malta Convoys 1940–1943. London: John Murray. ISBN0-7195-6408-5.
Further reading
Borghese, J. Valerio (1952). Sea Devils: Italian Navy Commandos in World War II. Translated by Cleugh, James. London: A. Mlrose. ISBN1-55750-072-X.
Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (2004). The Black Prince and the Sea Devils: The Story of Valerio Borghese and the Elite Units of the Decima Mas. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. ISBN0-306-81311-4.
Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (2015) [2004]. Il principe nero Junio Valerio Borghese e la Borghese (in Italian). Translated by Alvera, Emanuela. Milano: Mondadori. ISBN978-8-85-208209-2.
Schofield, William; Carisella, P. J.; Caso, Adolph (2004). Frogmen: First Battles. Boston: Branden Books. ISBN0-8283-2088-8.
