Western nations' attempts to establish spheres of influence
The Scramble for China,[1] also known as the Partition of China[2] or the Scramble for Concessions,[3] was a concept that existed during the 1890s in Europe, the United States, and the Empire of Japan for the partitioning of China under the Qing dynasty as their own spheres of influence, during the era of "New Imperialism". However, the United States Secretary of State created the Open Door Policy in 1899 which sought to prevent the European powers from trying to carve up China into colonies and proposed that all interested powers had equal access to China.[4] The policy was gradually accepted by the major powers so that the concept of the partitioning of China generally lost favor by the early 20th century.
Chinese press routinely described the scramble as the "carving up of the melon" (瓜分),[5] and modern Chinese writers usually consider such events in China part of the century of humiliation that began with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and ended with China established as a great power in 1945 or the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Marxist historians in China considered China during this period a semi-colony because of the domination by the Western countries.[6] On the other hand, the Scramble for Africa by the Western European powers also appeared around the same time, which resulted in the direct colonization of almost all of the African continent by 1914.
History
The Qing dynasty reached its peak during the 18th century, with a large population and territory. Until the early 19th century, the internal areas of the Qing Empire had little influence from European powers. At that time, the Qing government only allowed Western European countries to conduct any trade with China in Guangzhou under the Canton System. But as new technology began to unbalance the relationship in the 19th century, foreigners gradually gathered around the declining Qing Empire. The great powers such as Britain that won the Opium Wars initially only demanded the creation of a new framework for China's foreign relations and overseas trade, including privileges such as extraterritoriality and treaty ports. But with China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War and the signing of the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Empire of Japan in 1895, China was considered the "Sick man of Asia", and the ambitions of the great powers to compete for spheres of influence in China were greatly stimulated.[1][7]
As the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions wrote in 1898, Europe's current Scramble for China was much like its Scramble for Africa, which had sparked many discussions since a few years ago; China's vulnerability was made clear to the world in its 1895 war with Japan, and her current state could encourage eagles to flock together; and they had not taken long to do this – Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and others had all staked claims and were aggressively advancing their projects.[7]
In 1899, Italy also presented an ultimatum to the Chinese government, demanding the lease of Sanmen Bay in Zhejiang. However, this demand was sternly rejected by China. The Empress Dowager Cixi, the effective ruler of Qing China then decided that enough was enough[8] and stated at a palace meeting that "not a single piece of loess will be given to the Italians", and such policy ultimately forced Italy to give up any claim to China's coast. The Chinese justified their refusal by arguing that Italy had no genuine political or economic stakes in China. And indeed the Italian demand to emulate the major nations was mostly motivated by concerns of prestige. However, it was said that the result was that Italy "was made to appear a third or fourth-rate power".[9] The fiasco was an embarrassment for Italy, which was still stung by its defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian Empire in the Battle of Adowa in 1896.[10] Such event in China also dispelled any idea of second-rate powers at that time like the Netherlands or Denmark taking the opportunity to participate in the Scramble for China.[8][11]
The fact that China being humiliated by foreign powers caused strong xenophobia inside the country and became the fuse of the Boxer Rebellion, an uprising against foreigners and Christians that occurred in China around 1900, begun by peasants but eventually supported by the Qing government under the Empress Dowager Cixi. Cixi issued an imperial decree in the name of Guangxu Emperor that was a de factodeclaration of war on the invading powers, who in turn formed a multinational military coalition known as the Eight-Nation Alliance which invaded northern China and defeated the "Boxers". With the success of the invasion, the later stages developed into a punitive colonial expedition, which pillaged the capital Beijing and North China for more than a year. The fighting ended in 1901 with the signing of the Boxer Protocol.[12]
China continued to be divided up into these spheres until the United States, which had no sphere of influence in China and only recently acquired the Philippines from Spain, grew alarmed at the possibility of its businessmen being excluded from Chinese markets. To prevent the "carving of China like a melon", as the European powers were doing in Africa at the time, the U.S. Secretary of State John Hay created the Open Door Policy that called for a system of equal trade and investment and to guarantee the territorial integrity of Qing China, and circulated a note known as the "Open Door Note" (dated September 6, 1899) to the major European powers.[13] The Note asked the powers to keep China open to trade with all countries on an equal basis and called upon all powers, within their spheres of influence to refrain from interfering with any treaty port or any vested interest, to permit Chinese authorities to collect tariffs on an equal basis, and to show no favors to their own nationals in the matter of harbor dues or railroad charges.
The Open Door policy was then accepted only grudgingly, if at all, by the major powers, and it had no legal standing or enforcement mechanism. Each country tried to evade Hay's request by taking the position that it could not commit itself until the other nations had complied. However, by July 1900, Hay announced that each of the powers had granted its consent in principle. Although treaties after 1900 referred to the Open Door Policy, competition continued abated among the various powers for special concessions within China for railroad rights, mining rights, loans, foreign trade ports, and so forth.[14] On October 6, 1900, Britain and Germany signed the Yangtze Agreement to oppose the partition of China into spheres of influence. The agreement, signed by Lord Salisbury and Ambassador Paul von Hatzfeldt, was an endorsement of the Open Door Policy. The Germans supported it because a partition of China would limit Germany to a small trading market, instead of all of China.[15][16] Over the next decades, American policy-makers and national figures continued to refer to the Open Door Policy as a basic doctrine, which stopped the European powers from carving up China into colonies, but did allow them to establish spheres of influence.[4]
^Coco, Orazio (24 April 2019). "Italian diplomacy in China: the forgotten affair of Sān Mén Xiàn (1898–1899)". Journal of Modern Italian Studies. 24 (2): 328–349. doi:10.1080/1354571X.2019.1576416. S2CID150961616.
^Hevia, James L. "Looting and its discontents: Moral discourse and the plunder of Beijing, 1900–1901" in R. Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann (eds.), The Boxers, China, and the world Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009 [ISBN missing]
^Sugita, Yoneyuki, "The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes toward China" in Richard J. Jensen, Jon Thares Davidann, and Yoneyuki Sugita, eds. Trans-Pacific relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the twentieth century (Greenwood, 2003) pp 3–20
^"Yangtze Agreement", Historical Dictionary of the British Empire (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), pp. 1176 [ISBN missing]
^Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860–1914 (1980) pp 243, 354.[ISBN missing]